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Abstract
Neural Networks are being integrated into safety critical
systems, e.g., perception systems for autonomous vehicles,
which require trained networks to perform safely in novel
scenarios. It is challenging to verify neural networks because
their decisions are not explainable, they cannot be exhaus-
tively tested, and finite test samples cannot capture the vari-
ation across all operating conditions. Existing work seeks to
train models robust to new scenarios via domain adaptation,
style transfer, or few-shot learning. But these techniques fail
to predict how a trained model will perform when the operat-
ing conditions differ from the testing conditions. We propose
a metric, Machine Learning (ML) Dependability, that mea-
sures the network’s probability of success in specified oper-
ating conditions which need not be the testing conditions. In
addition, we propose the metrics Task Undependability and
Harmful Undependability to distinguish network failures by
their consequences. We evaluate the performance of a Neu-
ral Network agent trained using Reinforcement Learning in
a simulated robot manipulation task. Our results demonstrate
that we can accurately predict the ML Dependability, Task
Undependability, and Harmful Undependability for operat-
ing conditions that are significantly different from the testing
conditions. Finally, we design a Safety Function, using harm-
ful failures identified during testing, that reduces harmful fail-
ures, in one example, by a factor of 700 while maintaining a
high probability of success.
Introduction
Neural Networks are being integrated into safety criti-
cal, cyber-physical systems, e.g., object detection for au-
tonomous vehicles (Grigorescu et al. 2019). Relying on
learned networks to automate safety critical tasks requires
robust network evaluation. Neural Networks (hereafter re-
ferred to as networks) make decisions that are not explain-
able. Most networks cannot be exhaustively tested. Recent
work shows that network performance can be brittle and
change with minimal changes to the input data distributions
(Recht et al. 2018). It is unclear how to predict a network’s
performance in an untested scenario; thus, it is unclear how
to predict a network’s performance in untested operating
conditions.
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Training Robust Networks
The Machine Learning (ML) community is actively re-
searching techniques to train models robust to unseen sce-
narios via domain adaptation, style transfer, or few-shot
learning. Prior work has also investigated how to ensure
safety during network training (Turchetta, Berkenkamp, and
Krause 2016), (Zhang, Balkcom, and Li 2019).
Domain Adaptation Domain adaptation seeks to adjust
a trained network to new operating domains. See (Csurka
2017) for a survey of visual domain adaptation techniques.
RoyChowdhury et al. propose a method to leverage unla-
beled data in a new operating domain to fine-tune a trained
network (RoyChowdhury et al. 2019). RoyChowdhury et al.
show an increase in pedestrian detection over baseline for a
network trained using sunny images from the Berkely Deep
Drive Dataset (BDD100K) (Yu et al. 2018) and adapted to
rainy, overcast, snowy day, and night images. Liu et al. ad-
dress Open Domain Adaptation (generalizing to an unseen
target domain) and Compound Domain Adaptation (gener-
alizing to combined target domains) (Liu et al. 2019). Liu et
al. demonstrate results on a compound target of rainy, cloudy
and snowy and an open target of overcast images.
Style Transfer In perception, style transfer is used to ren-
der images from one domain as if they were from another.
Style transfer can be used in safety critical tasks to render a
novel scenario in a known style. CycleGANs have achieved
impressive results rendering photographs as if they were
painted by different artists and transferring the style of sim-
ilar animals, e.g., rendering a horse as a zebra (Zhu et al.
2017). Gong et al. extend CycleGANs for continuous style
generation flowing from one domain to another (Gong et al.
2019). Gong et al. demonstrate results transferring styles be-
tween object detection datasets.
Few-Shot and Zero-Shot Learning Few-shot (zero-shot)
learning aims to learn a task for given operating condi-
tions with little (no) labeled training data. James et al. use
a task embedding to leverage knowledge from previously
learned, similar tasks (James, Bloesch, and Davison 2018)
and demonstrate that a robot can learn new tasks with only
one real-world demonstration. See (Wang et al. 2019) for a
survey of zero-shot learning.
Software Dependability
Software dependability is defined in (Avizienis et al. 2004)
as “a system’s ability to avoid service failures that are more
frequent and more severe than acceptable”. Initial work im-
proving the Dependability of ML models proposed testing-
based approaches to estimate the performance of software
when no testing-oracle is available (Murphy and Kaiser
2008).
Adaptive Network Testing
Automated test case generation is often necessary in soft-
ware verification, because most software cannot be tested
exhaustively. See (Anand et al. 2013) for an orchestrated
survey of automated testing techniques. Adversarial tech-
niques can be used to identify catastrophic failures in net-
works performing safety critical tasks (Uesato et al. 2018).
Recent work evaluated autonomous vehicles by selecting
test scenarios along boundaries where the models perfor-
mance changed quickly (Mullins et al. 2018). Mullins et al.
parameterized the testing space by possible variations in the
mission and environment and defined test outcomes by mis-
sion success or failure and safety success or failure.
Our Contributions
In ML, network performance is typically measured by the
probability of success. We propose that how a network fails
can be as important as the probability a network will suc-
ceed. Specifically, we distinguish between failures that do
not violate safety constraints, which we call task failures,
and failures that violate safety constraints (whether or not
the task is completed), which we call harmful failures.
In this work, we propose the performance of a network
is described by the fraction of successes, task failures, and
harmful failures for a given task in specified conditions. To
the best of our knowledge, we tackle the previously unad-
dressed problem: how to evaluate network performance and
safety after training is complete, when the operating condi-
tions differ from the testing conditions. Following a Nota-
tions section, the contents of this paper are as follows:
1. We define ML Dependability1 as the probability of com-
pleting a task without harm. We define Task Undepend-
ability and Harmful Undependability to distinguish fail-
ures by the consequences: task failures causing no harm
as opposed to harmful failures.
2. We develop mathematics to predict the model perfor-
mance in novel operating conditions by re-weighting
known test results with knowledge of the novel operating
condition probabilities.
3. We accurately predict the ML Dependability, Task Unde-
pendability, and Harmful Undependability of a network
trained to perform a simulated robot manipulation task in
novel operating conditions using test results.
4. We design a Safety Function to reduce harmful failures in
the simulated robot manipulation task under testing con-
ditions. We reduce the harmful failures, in one example,
1This is distinct from software Dependability defined in
(Avizienis et al. 2004).
by a factor of 700 while maintaining a high probability of
success.
5. We discuss how this work can be translated to practical
applications and describe directions for future work.
Notation
pi the trained Neural Network
X the set of all possible domain scenarios
x a domain scenario. x ∈ X
pi(x) success indicator for pi in scenario x
piavg(rd) the average value of pi(x) for scenarios x
in region rd
piT (x) task failure indicator for pi in scenario x
piH(x) harmful failure indicator for pi in scenario x
τ the testing conditions
O the operating conditions
Pτ (X), PO(X) the probability distribution describing
all possible scenarios during testing,
operation (respectively)
pτ (x), pO(x) the probability of encountering scenario x
during testing, operation (respectively)
DO(pi) the dependability of pi in conditions O
UTO (pi) the task undependability of pi in conditions O
UHO (pi) the harmful undependability of pi
in conditions O
v the obstacle velocity [inches/second]
in the robot simulation experiments
t the obstacle start time [seconds] in the
robot simulation experiments
y the robot goal position [inches] in the
robot simulation experiments
Methods
Machine Learning Dependability
In this work we evaluate the performance of a trained, deter-
ministic neural network, pi, performing a safety critical task.
A domain scenario, x, is defined as one set of environment
conditions and goals for the network. A network may be
used iteratively within one scenario, e.g., a controller mov-
ing a robot incrementally towards a goal, or used once, e.g.,
a classifier labelling a sensor reading as valid or faulty. For
each scenario, the network attempts to complete a task with-
out causing harm. The outcome of deploying a network in
a scenario is the observed behavior mode. We define three
behavior modes: success, task failure, and harmful failure.
A network is successful if it accomplished the task without
causing harm. A task failure occurs when the network failed
to complete the specified task but did not cause harm. Any
scenario where the network caused harm is labeled a harmful
failure, whether or not the task was completed. The domain
space, X , of a network describes the set of possible domain
scenarios. A fully-observed domain includes all variables in
the environment and system which impact the outcome of
the network. A partially-observed domain includes a subset
of the full domain. The input space of a network is defined
as the information the network observes. When a network
is deployed iteratively, it may observe many inputs for one
scenario. The input may include components of the domain
space, but need not include the entire domain space. Domain
spaces may be numerical or categorical. Note that for a fully-
observed numerical domain, one domain scenario x maps to
exactly one behavior mode2.
We indicate the success of running network pi in scenario
x as pi(x). pi(x) = 1 when the model is successful in sce-
nario x; pi(x) = 0 when the model has a task or harm-
ful failure. pi is tested with N sampled scenarios {xn}Nn=1,
xn ∼ Pτ (X) where pτ (xn) describes the probability of en-
countering scenario xn during testing. We define Machine
Learning Dependability as the probability that a model will
succeed when operated under specified conditions. We aim
to estimate DO(pi): the ML Dependability of model pi de-
ployed under the operating conditions described by PO(X),
where PO(X) 6= Pτ (X)3.
For this analysis, it is assumed that the domain space is
numerical and fully observed, that Pτ (X) and PO(X) are
known, and that while PO(X) 6= Pτ (X), both distributions
have the same domain space X .
Derivation
Discrete-Bounded Domain Space To begin, we assume
X is discrete with finite D possible values, X = {xd}Dd=1.
The probability distribution describing scenarios during test-
ing is:
Pτ (X) = {pτ (x1), ..., pτ (xD)} = {pτ (xd)}Dd=1 (1)
The probability distribution describing scenarios during op-
eration is:
PO(X) = {pO(xd)}Dd=1 (2)
Note that Pτ (X) and PO(X) can be estimated without test-
ing or operating the network. As a motivating example,
imagine a perception network for an autonomous vehicle.
The perception network is trained and tested in Palo Alto
but will operate in Seattle. Information like weather patterns
can be used to estimate the probability of different scenarios
during testing and operation without recording or labelling
data in the testing or operating conditions.
The ML Dependability of network pi operating in condi-
tions O is defined as the probability that model pi succeeds
when deployed in a scenario x randomly sampled from the
operating conditions x ∼ PO(X). This is computed as the
expected value of pi(x), for x ∼ PO(X).
DO(pi) = E[pi(x)], x ∼ PO(X) (3)
2pi(x) can map to multiple values if x does not fully describe
the variables that impact the success of the model, i.e., the domain
is partially-observed. We define the domain space for modalities
like images or speech as partially observed, because many different
pixel-values or spectrographs can represent a specified label (a tree
in the rain, a man saying “hello world”). When pi(x) cannot be
modeled as a constant value, it may be modeled as a distribution.
Extending this work to partially-observed domains is an important
challenge we hope to address in future work.
3The ML Dependability of pi under testing conditions, Dτ (pi),
is equal to the network accuracy or the fraction of successful tests:
Dτ (pi) =
∑N
i=1
pi(xi)
N
. Likewise, UTτ (pi) =
∑N
i=1
piT (xi)
N
and
UHτ (pi) =
∑N
i=1
piH (xi)
N
.
DO(pi) =
D∑
d=1
pO(xd) ∗ pi(xd) (4)
PO(X) is known. pi(xd) must be evaluated via testing. The
reader is reminded that the network is fixed and it is assumed
the domain space is numerical and fully observed, so pi(xd)
is 1 or 0 for a unique xd. If the domain space of the network
is truly discrete and D < ∞, then the network can be ex-
haustively tested with D tests. (Note, if D is finite but large
it may be infeasible to exhaustively test the network. This
case may be treated as discrete-unbounded.) In most appli-
cations, the domain space is discrete-unbounded or continu-
ous so the network cannot be tested exhaustively.
Discrete-Unbounded or Continuous Domain Space We
approximate discrete-unbounded or continuous domain
spaces as discrete-bounded by partitioning X into D par-
titions, with D < ∞. Let the dth partition be defined as
the contiguous region rd of X , such that ∪˙Dd=1rd = X .
The reader is reminded that N test scenarios are drawn from
Pτ (X) as {xn}Nn=1.Nd scenarios lie in each partition where
{xdi }Ndi=1 denotes the scenarios in partition d. We require the
partitions are defined so that at least one test scenario lies
within each partition,Nd > 0,∀d ∈ [0, D]. PO(X) is equiv-
alently described by:
PO(X) = {pO(rd)}Dd=1 (5)
where pO(rd) is computed as: pO(rd) =
∑
xn∈rd pO(xn)
for discrete-unbounded domains, or pO(rd) =
∫
rd
pO(x)dx
for continuous domains4. piavg(rd) can be estimated as:
piavg(rd) ≈
∑Nd
i=1 pi(x
d
i )
Nd
(6)
The overall ML Dependability can now be approximated as:
DO(pi) ≈
D∑
d=1
pO(rd) ∗ piavg(rd) (7)
DO(pi) ≈
D∑
d=1
pO(rd) ∗
∑Nd
i=1 pi(x
d
i )
Nd
(8)
Estimating Undependability In a similar manner, we can
estimate the undependability of the model pi in the operating
conditions O. piT (x) = 1 when the task is not completed
but no harm is done, and piT (x) = 0 otherwise. The Task
Undependability, UTO (pi), is the probability that the model
will fail to complete the desired task without causing harm
in conditions O. We compute the Task Undependability as:
UTO (pi) = E[pi
T (x)], x ∼ PO(X) (9)
UTO (pi) ≈
D∑
d=1
pO(rd) ∗
∑Nd
i=1 pi
T (xdi )
Nd
(10)
4Note, x is not required to be one dimensional.
piH(x) = 1 in the event of a harmful failure, and is
zero otherwise. The Harmful Undependability of the
model, UHO (pi), is the probability that the model will cause
harm when operated in conditionsO, whether or not the task
is completed. The Harmful Undependability is computed
as:
UHO (pi) = E[pi
H(x)], x ∼ PO(X) (11)
UHO (pi) ≈
D∑
d=1
pO(rd) ∗
∑Nd
i=1 pi
H(xdi )
Nd
(12)
Note that success, task failure, and harmful failure are mu-
tually exclusive, so DO(pi) + UTO (pi) + U
H
O (pi) = 1.
Experiments
We evaluated the performance of a Neural Network agent
trained via Reinforcement Learning to move a simulated
robot in the presence of an obstacle that moves at a con-
stant velocity, v, starting at time t. The obstacle moves from
right to left in the scene with its bottom edge 25 inches from
the robot base. The robot’s task is to reach or exceed a goal
position, y, while avoiding the obstacle, see Figure 1. The
domain space, X , is defined as v ∈ [0, 10] inches/second,
t ∈ [0, 10] seconds, and y ∈ [0, 50] inches. The domain
space X is bounded, continuous, and fully observed. The
robot starts at 0 inches and is constrained to be within [0, 50]
inches5. The simulations last 100 seconds and the network
moves the robot forward 5 inches or back 5 inches every sec-
ond. The robot moves for the entire 100 second simulation,
even after the goal position is reached. A simulation only
terminates before 100 seconds if the robot collides with the
obstacle.
To succeed, the robot must reach or exceed the goal posi-
tion before the end of the simulation and avoid the obstacle
for the entire simulation. A simulation is a task failure if the
robot does not reach the goal position but avoids collision
with the obstacle. Any simulation where the robot collides
with the obstacle is a harmful failure. In the following re-
sults, the behavior modes are denoted with the following col-
ors: success is indicated with green, task failure with blue,
and harmful failure with pink.
The network consists of two linear layers separated by a
Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) and is trained using a modified
version of the PyTorch Q-Learning tutorial (Paszke 2019).
Each second, the network observes the position of the ob-
stacle, the position of the robot, the speed of the obstacle,
and the robot goal. Timing information is not input to the
network. Zero-mean Gaussian noise with a standard devia-
tion of 0.1, 0.1, 0.5 for v, t, and y respectively is added to
the inputs to simulate sensor noise. The reward function for
the network was designed so reaching the goal resulted in a
reward of 30 points and colliding with the obstacle resulted
in a penalty of -50 points. Before reaching the goal position,
the network received a small reward of 5 points for moving
towards the goal or a penalty of -5 points for moving away
5If the robot tries to move outside this region, the position is
clipped. There is no penalty for trying to move outside the valid
region.
Figure 1: The simulated robot manipulation task. To suc-
ceed, the robot must avoid the obstacle, which moves at a
constant velocity v from right to left, starting at time t, and
reach or exceed a goal location, y, between 0 and 50 inches.
t1: the obstacle has started moving. t2: the robot is avoid-
ing collision with the obstacle. t3: the robot has successfully
reached and/or exceeded its goal position without colliding
with the obstacle.
from the goal. Before the obstacle had passed the robot, the
network received a reward of 2 points for each time step
it was below the obstacle and a penalty of -2 points each
time step it was in the path of the obstacle. The point values
for reaching the goal (+30 points) and collision (-50 points)
were chosen to prioritize safety over task completion. Like-
wise, the intermediate rewards were chosen so that moving
towards the goal (±5 points) was prioritized above a poten-
tial, future collision (±2 points).
Performance during Testing
X is a bounded, continuous domain space. We sample
100,000 test scenarios uniformly from the domain space:
Pτ (X) : v ∼ U(0, 10), t ∼ U(0, 10), y ∼ U(0, 50)
where U(a, b) indicates a uniform probability distribution
from a to b. We deployed the trained network in each test
scenario to evaluate the network performance. The network
had an ML Dependability of 90.35%, a Task Undependabil-
ity of 4.18%, and a Harmful Undependability of 5.47%. See
Figure 2 for a plot of observed failures by test scenario.
Task failures (shown in blue in Figure 2) occurred
when the obstacle speed was less than or equal to 0.80
inches/second. Inspection revealed that the network learned
to wait for the obstacle to pass before moving forward. In
many cases the robot moved as far forward as it could, ex-
ceeding the input robot goal. When the obstacle moved very
slowly, this strategy did not give the network enough time
to reach the goal. Harmful failures (shown in pink in Figure
2) occurred when the robot goal was greater than or equal to
38.47 inches.
We partition each dimension of the domain space into 10
equal regions to obtain 1,000 voxels in domain space. v and
t are divided into regions 1 inch/second and 1 second wide
(respectively). y is divided into regions 5 inches wide. We
use these voxels to predict the model performance in new
operating conditions.
Figure 2: The observed failures during testing. Blue indi-
cates a task failure. Pink indicates a harmful failure. The
task failures (along the left ‘wall’ of the figure) occurred
when the obstacle speed was less than or equal to 0.80
inches/second. The harmful failures (along the ‘ceiling’ of
the figure) occurred when the robot goal was greater than or
equal to 38.47 inches.
Predicting Model Performance in Novel Operating
Conditions
We demonstrate that our method can predict the perfor-
mance of a network when deployed in novel operating con-
ditions. We define four novel operating conditions in Table
1. The harmful failures in testing occurred for robot goals
greater than or equal to 38.47 inches. We selected Operat-
ing Conditions 1 to simulate safe conditions: y ∈ [0, 30]
inches. Operating Conditions 2 simulate dangerous condi-
tions: y ∈ [30, 50] inches. We also wanted to select distri-
butions other than uniform (the testing distribution) to make
the prediction task more challenging. We selected Operating
Conditions 3 to introduce a Gaussian domain distribution
and focus the obstacle velocity v towards slower speeds to
target the area where task failures occurred. Operating Con-
ditions 4 are the most challenging to predict with Gaussian
Table 1: Novel Operating Condition Specification.N (µ, σ2)
denotes a Gaussian with a mean of µ and a standard devia-
tion of σ. The sampled scenarios x ∼ N (µ, σ2) are clipped
to lie within the specified domain X . x < X.min is set to
X.min and x > X.max is set to X.max. t is not listed
because t ∼ U(0, 10) for all conditions.
Conditions v y
Testing Conditions ∼ U(0, 10) ∼ U(0, 50)
Operating Conditions 1 ∼ U(0, 10) ∼ U(0, 30)
Operating Conditions 2 ∼ U(0, 10) ∼ U(30, 50)
Operating Conditions 3 ∼ N (3, 22) ∼ U(30, 50)
Operating Conditions 4 ∼ N (3, 22) ∼ N (35, 102)
Figure 3: Predicted and observed performance of the trained
network in novel operating conditions. Operating conditions
(OC) predicted performance shown left in light colors. Ob-
served performance shown right in bold colors. ML Depend-
ability DO(pi) is shown as solid green, Task Undependabil-
ity UTO (pi) is shown as blue hatched, and Harmful Unde-
pendability UHO (pi) is shown as pink dotted bars.
distributions in v and y focused towards observed task fail-
ures and harmful failures.
We used the partitions defined above to predict the model
performance. To confirm our predictions, 100,000 simula-
tions were run for each set of operating conditions. A com-
parison of our predicted network performance with the ob-
served performance is shown in Figure 3, above. We accu-
rately predicted the ML Dependability, Task Undependabil-
ity, and Harmful Undependability within 2% of observed re-
sults.
Performance with a Safety Function
Testing revealed that harmful failures only occurred with
robot goals greater than or equal to 38.47 inches. We
designed a Safety Function to reduce harmful failures by
clipping the robot goal input to the network to be between
[0, 38.47−δ] inches. We chose δ = 0.5 inches. The reader is
reminded that the network continues to move the robot after
the goal position is reached, until the simulation ends at 100
seconds. Clipping the robot goal input to the network was
intended to make the network behave more conservatively6;
it was still possible for the robot to exceed the clipped goal
and reach the original goal position. The Safety Function
did not change the conditions for success: for a simulation
to be successful the robot had to reach the original goal
position. 100,000 new test scenarios were sampled from the
Testing Conditions and run with the Safety Function. With
the Safety Function, the network had a ML Dependability of
95.19%, a Task Undependability of 4.81%, and a Harmful
6This is a similar idea to Control Governors (Garone,
Di Cairano, and Kolmanovsky 2017).
Figure 4: A comparison of the network performance without the Safety Function and with the Safety Function. Task failures
are indicated in blue. Harmful failures are indicated in pink. (a) a reprint of Figure 2 to facilitate comparison. (b) the observed
failures in Testing Conditions with the Safety Function. (c) a comparison of the network ML Dependability, Task Undepend-
ability, and Harmful Undependability with and without the Safety Function. Note, the Harmful Undependability is reduced
from 5.47% to 0.007% with the Safety Function.
Undependability of 0.007%. Figure 4, above, offers a
side-by-side comparison of observed failures and network
performance with and without the Safety Function.
Discussion
Robot Manipulation Task
We see in Figure 2 that the network performance varies by
region in the domain space. Partitioning the domain space
enables these regional variations to emerge when we predict
the network performance in novel operating conditions.
Overall, we accurately predict the performance of the net-
work in novel operating conditions. Across the four pro-
posed operating conditions and three performance metrics,
the error between the predicted and observed performance
percentage was within 2%. The prediction is poorer for
Gaussian domain spaces as compared to uniformly dis-
tributed domain spaces. Finer partitioning of the domain
space would lead to better predictions and may be necessary
as domain space distributions become more complex.
The Safety Function reduced the number of harmful fail-
ures by a factor of 700. Surprisingly, even though our Safety
Function clipped the input robot goal, it converted many
harmful failures into successes. Clipping the robot goal
made the network behave more “patiently”, i.e. the network
waited for the obstacle to pass before moving as far forward
as it could. In general, we expect Safety Functions to re-
duce the probability of harmful failures, but we do not expect
them to increase the probability of success. Our Safety Func-
tion was hand-crafted, but in the future, Safety Functions can
be learned. It may also be desirable to design or learn differ-
ent Safety Functions for different operating conditions. Tar-
geted Safety Functions could prove a scalable approach for
ensuring safety in dynamic environments, and may be more
feasible than retraining the network for different operating
conditions.
Understanding the Network’s Behavior Both failure
modes of the network, task failure and harmful failure, re-
late to timing. The current time step was not an input to the
network; subsequently the network did not learn to make
decisions based on timing. The network ML Dependability
could be improved in the future by adding a timing input.
Task failures occurred when the obstacle speed was less
than or equal to 0.80 inches per second. The network learned
to wait for the obstacle to pass the robot before moving past
the obstacle, towards the goal. When the obstacle moved
slowly this strategy did not give the robot enough time to
reach the goal. But, in these scenarios the network had am-
ple time to reach the robot goal before the obstacle passed
the robot. Adding a timing input could allow the network to
learn more sophisticated timing strategies.
Harmful failures occurred when the robot goal was greater
than or equal to 38.47 inches. The network learned an incor-
rect trade-off between moving towards the goal and avoiding
the obstacle. The Safety Function results, see Figure 4, re-
veal that in most of the scenarios that were harmful failures
in testing, the robot had enough time to avoid collision and
reach the goal before the end of the simulation. But the strat-
egy learned by the network did not time the robot’s approach
correctly. Interestingly, the reward function was specifically
designed to weight safety over task completion: a collision
resulted in a penalty of -50 points whereas reaching the goal
resulted in a reward of 30 points. While we do not claim
that it would be impossible to craft a reward function to
perfectly complete this task without harm, this example il-
lustrates that designing a reward function that appropriately
weights task requirements and safety constraints is not triv-
ial. Safety Functions are an explainable alternative to hand
crafting reward functions and guarantee a degree of safety
for a network.
Dependable Networks in Practical Applications
We make several key assumption in our analysis. The impli-
cations of these assumptions determine how this work can
be applied in practical applications. We assume that the do-
main space is numerical. Many applications have numerical
domains such as force sensors and distance sensors, e.g. li-
dar.
We assume the domain is fully observed. A domain space
may be fully observed in a constrained, industrial setting.
But as learned networks move into unconstrained, dynamic
environments, it is not possible to assume the domain space
is fully observed. In partially observed domain spaces, the
key change is that we do not assume one scenario x maps to
exactly one output. When we modeled discrete-unbounded
and continuous fully observed domain spaces, we modeled
the performance of a network in a regions as piavg(rd). This
can be extended in the future to model the distribution of
outcomes observed from scenario xwhen the domain is only
partially observed. The quality of the performance predic-
tions will vary by how well the partially observed domain
describes the full domain. Adequate domain coverage re-
quires expert knowledge. Choosing the dimensions by which
we model the domain is an existing challenge and is a di-
rection for further research. Another challenge in modeling
practical domain spaces is the curse of dimensionality: as the
dimension of the domain space grows, the number of parti-
tions or regions can grow prohibitively large. We believe this
challenge can be overcome in the future by either selectively
choosing the domain to focus on the critical modes of varia-
tion for the given application, or leveraging similar scenarios
‘across’ domain variations to limit the effective dimension of
the domain space.
We assume Pτ (X) and PO(X) are known. As stated ear-
lier, Pτ (X) and PO(X) can be estimated empirically from
statistical data or domain knowledge. Lastly, we assume
both distributions cover the same domain space X and that
the number of test samples in each partition is greater than
zero. This assumption requires some care when designing
the partitions.
Future Work
In the future we hope to investigate methods to automatically
partition the domain space. We also want to estimate the
confidence intervals for predicted ML Dependability, Task
Undependability, and Harmful Undependability using the
number of samples available in each partition. A rich direc-
tion for future research is extending this work to partially-
observed domains such as perception. Safety in partially-
observed domain spaces is particularly relevant for technol-
ogy like autonomous vehicles.
Conclusions
We define and derive the metrics ML Dependability, Task
Undependability, and Harmful Undependability to predict
a trained network’s performance in novel operating condi-
tions. We demonstrate that our metrics can predict the per-
formance of a trained network in novel operating conditions
within 2% of observed performance for a simulated robot
manipulation task. We designed a hand-crafted Safety Func-
tion to avoid harmful failures identified during testing; the
Safety Function was demonstrated to reduce harmful fail-
ures by a factor of 700.
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